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Everyday agency and centred
marginality: being “youth” in the
oil-rich Niger Delta of Nigeria
« Faire le jeune » dans les gangs de l’économie clandestine pétrolière (delta du
Niger, Nigéria)
Akin Iwilade
1 Since 1956, oil production has been a major source of revenue for the Nigerian state
and one of its key links to the global economy. This production has centred around the
mangrove creeks and rivers of the Niger Delta region and huge offshore fields in the
Gulf of Guinea, which have generated hundreds of billions of US dollars in revenue over
the last 50 years (Watts, 2008). The recent history of oil production in the Niger Delta
has been framed by multiple paradoxes. Chief among these is that, whereas the region
has  brought  in  so  much in  oil  wealth  for  the  Nigerian  state,  political  elite  and oil
multinationals, poverty remains a reality of everyday life for many people living in the
region  (Omeje,  2004;  Imobighe,  2011).  The  high  levels  of  inequality  are  embedded
within  a  social  fabric  that  is  complex  not  just  because  of  the  sheer  number  and
dynamism  of  identities  that  compete  for  access  to  oil  resources  within  the  region
(Ejobowah, 2000), but also because this competition is fought out in spite of a general
sense  of  shared  marginality.  Many  analysts  have  written  extensively  about  the
profound implications of ethnic/community-themed contestations in the region and
how  oil  extraction  has  been  the  canvas upon  which  many  grievance  registers  are
played out (Welch, 1995; Nwajiaku, 2005; Umejesi and Akpan, 2013).
2 The role that oil extraction plays in shaping social relations and politics in the Niger
Delta underlines not just the complexity of the resource (or indeed natural resources
extraction more generally) as a driver of development but also the specific ways in
which  postcolonial  institutions  can  shape  or  be  shaped  by  the  flow  of  a  globally
relevant resource. In many ways, Niger Delta youth have been the most vocal social
category challenging these contradictions (Obi, 2006; Osaghae and al., 2011; Ugor, 2013;
Iwilade,  2014).  This  is  not  surprising  given  the  large-scale  distortions  that  the  oil
Everyday agency and centred marginality: being “youth” in the oil-rich Niger ...
Ateliers d'anthropologie, 47 | 2020
1
industry had inflicted on local livelihoods as well as its impact on an emergent youth
culture  of  violent  protest  that  has  been  legitimised  by  the  violence-themed
engagements seemingly favoured by the Nigerian state and multinational oil companies
(Ifeka, 2006; Iwilade, 2014). The Niger Delta’s urban spaces are the sites in which many
of these violent social mobilisations have taken place. This paper explores the meaning
of youth in Colombia—a very vibrant youth-controlled urban space.
3 In order to explore youth meanings in the Delta context, this paper is divided into four
substantive sections.  The first provides a brief  description of  the neighbourhood of
Colombia in the oil city of Port Harcourt. This is the research site from which themes in
the  construction  of  youth  meanings  in  the  context  of  a  broader  oil  economy  are
extracted. Having provided this descriptive context of the research site,  the section
that  follows  explores  what  youth  means.  In  particular,  it  disaggregates  that
generational category and, by drawing on insights from Colombia, argues that being
youth is profoundly different from being young. The next two sections explore various
aspects of this argument by discussing the notion of “angels”—that is, young people
who are not engaged in violent politicised or economic action—and the implications of
respectability in these sorts of contexts for how we think of the youth category.
 
A brief look at Port Harcourt’s Colombia
neighbourhood
4 Colombia was a lower-middle-class neighbourhood located in the southern edge of the
oil city of Port Harcourt in Nigeria’s Rivers State. Its chaotic nature reflected, in many
ways, the urban decay that has been seen in many parts of Nigeria. Between 1996 and
2009, parts of the neighbourhood, especially what used to be its wide-open spaces, were
both a hotbed of gang violence and an example of youth-driven social organisation. The
Colombia label  is  partly,  I  am  told,  an  attempt  to  draw  parallels  with  the  1980s
“Escobaresque”  violent,  drug-driven  reputation  of  the  Latin  American  country  of
Colombia itself.
5 The heart of Port Harcourt’s Colombia is at Niger and Bende streets and most of the
social activities described here revolved around a large, open playground called the
“Number  One  Field”.  This  open  field  was  bound  on  one  side  by  small,  temporary
wooden shacks from which young women sold locally-made gin, beer, and pepper soup.
The  Romeo Night  Club  in  which  transactional  sex  and drug-dealing  activities  were
conducted was located close to the Number One Field. Young people often gathered
around  here,  mostly  in  the  evenings,  to  hang  out  in  a  space  that  offered  relative
protection from the state.
6 While the façade of Colombia appeared criminal and chaotic, it concealed a complex
system of collective organisation, social order and mutual support that thrived on its
distance from formal authority and the precarity it  created.  The Number One Field
reflected the urban decay that was set off in the late 1980s when structural adjustment
imposed cutbacks on social projects on the Nigerian government. The field had been
earmarked as a site for sports infrastructure for local youth, but was abandoned as a
result  of  the  pressures  of  adjustment.  The  space  has  since  been  reclaimed  by  the
government. The stories that relate directly to the open field that adjoins the Niger-
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Bende streets are therefore the recollections of community members who were active
in the area from about 1995 to 2009.
7 Routledge’s (1997: 70) notion of the tendency of social groups to “endow space with
amalgams of different meanings, uses and values” is relevant here as it illustrates the
ability  of  local  youth  to  create  alternate  cultures  and  realities  as  well  as  exert
considerable agency that, in this case, allowed them to negotiate new meanings of self,
of normality and of tradition. Apparently, the transnational implications and relevance
of urban violence and instability that few societies encapsulated better in the 1990s
than the narcotics- and corruption-fuelled violence in the real Colombia was not lost on
the youth of  Port  Harcourt’s  Colombia.  By appropriating the Colombia label,  youth
were, according to an informant (Amadi, int., 2014) “simply expressing [their] freedom
by changing the street name”.
8 The youth groups that circulated around Colombia in those early years, according to
Tarela Ebiede (int., 2017), initially evolved around the Agaba Boys, who were a social-
cultural  masquerade group that  operated in  many parts  of  the  Delta  region.  These
groups were not like the typical gun-wielding gangs of the early 2000s. In order for
them to evolve into the gangs that now exist in the Delta, there was an initial transition
phase into fraternities and cults.  These fraternities were youth groups whose raison
d’être was unashamedly criminal and violent—unlike the Agaba Boys, who, in spite of
occasional  involvement  in  everyday  criminalities, were  primarily  a  socio-cultural
outfit. The transition from Agaba to violent cults occurred in the context of profound
changes to the oil-driven political landscape of the Niger Delta and the new sets of
incentives that it brought in the light of the state’s militarisation of the region from the
mid-1990s  onwards.  Of  course,  cult  groups  and fraternities  had existed  in  Nigerian
youthscapes since the 1950s, but it was around the 1990s that they began to take a
violent turn in epidemic proportions (Asuni, 2009; Pérouse de Montclos, 2012). Delta
cult groups were unique in that they were not just youth groups rampaging across
higher institutions of learning, as in South West Nigeria (Momoh, 2000; Salaam, 2011),
but  they  were  intricately  connected  to  a  complex  broader  alternative  identity  and
citizenship  movement  which  combined  elements  of  ethnicity,  politics,  criminality,
spirituality and social ordering in its relationship with the oil state. Ultimately, Delta
cults appeared able to accommodate multiple forms of youthhood in ways that were
not generally possible in many other parts of Nigeria.
9 This fluid landscape of youth is possible in part because of the rapid social changes that
the oil  economy introduced into the Niger Delta region. In many ways, the broader
political economy of oil is a major canvas upon which the politics of gang-making and
youthhood  play  out  in  Port  Harcourt  more  generally  and  in  Colombia specifically.
Oruwari and Owei (2006: 6) note, for instance, that gangs in the city “have become a
security threat to oil workers” due to their “involvement […] in bunkering,1 extortions,
and kidnapping of expatriate oil  workers”. Many gang activities revolve around the
opportunities provided by the oil economy on the one hand and the distortions to local
livelihoods that it  simultaneously engenders on the other.  While gangs in Colombia
often engaged with what were very local issues, their sustenance and connections to
the wider society was very much framed by the politics of oil extraction. For instance,
many of the ethnic-themed gangs that frequented the neighbourhood were intimately
connected  to  extortion  and  kidnapping  rackets  which  targeted  oil  companies.  The
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income from these activities often fuelled violent struggles for supremacy across the
gang landscape in the Niger Delta.
10 As a  site  of  social  circulation within the gang universe  in  Port  Harcourt,  Colombia
represented a melting pot from which many of the youth who would play active roles
in the insurgency that was to rock the Nigerian oil economy to its very foundations
from around 2003 cut their teeth (Omeje, 2004; Oriola et al., 2013; Iwilade, 2014). This
part  of  the  city  of  Port  Harcourt  is  therefore  a  particularly  useful  entry  point  for
analysing both the everyday relevance and framing of  youth and also the way this
everyday  social  engagement  echoes  in  the  broader  recesses  of  local  and  national
politics.
 
Youth as doing and as belonging in Port Harcourt’s 
Colombia
How can you call yourself a youth when you just
sit down there doing nothing? What is the
purpose of your strength?
(Bozi, int., 2014)
11 At the start  of  any sustained engagement with young people  in  the Niger  Delta,  it
quickly becomes apparent that “youth” is an active concept. To be a “youth” within
conflict contexts, your concept of “youth” needs to be active in the sense that it  is
constantly navigating the unstable urban spaces,  circulating within what Maira and
Soep (2004) called “youthscapes” and/or participating in the many grey (often violent)
activities through which life acquires meaning in the neighbourhood. By constructing
youth as a verb, the concept becomes intertwined with connotations of agency as well
as of responsibility. It places the idea of being “youth” in a social struggle (often, but
not always,  generational)  that ultimately means that it  is  a  social  space into which
individuals cannot seek inclusion except through groups.
12 Being (doing) youth is profoundly different from being young. To be young, one needs
to be in a marginal social position in which one is subject to the rules of society and
dependent on its  benevolence.  To be “youth” however,  one cannot “sit  down there
doing nothing”;  therefore,  one must  “belong”.2 What this  indicates  is  that  youth is
essentially  an  acquired  status  only  available  to  those  who  can  access  the  violent
networks that shape political life in the region. One of the most constant refrains heard
during fieldwork in various parts  of  the Delta,  including Colombia,  is  the idea that
“youth” has a distinctly active connotation, often referring to those who “have street
credibility”, who are “not civilians”, and who “belong”. It hardly ever refers to young
people in the general population who are not actively involved in politicised or large-
scale violence. Interestingly, this category is the large silent majority of young people
in the Niger Delta. What Bozi, whom I quoted above, meant by “doing nothing” was not
that those in the general population were idle, but that they did not participate in the
many opportunities for violence, macho performances, and politics available in the oil
economy and that they had few connections to the patronage networks that shape the
region.
13 This is an interesting angle to the conceptualisation of “youth” in that it highlights
three key things. First, one has to actually be “doing things”, that is, participating in
the often dangerous social culture, to qualify to be youth. Being of the right generation
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or having similar experiences of social life means little if one is not within the networks
of violence involved in the multiplicities of disruptive activities in the region. I  use
disruptive here not in a pejorative sense but to capture activities designed to challenge
social norms or to renegotiate social relations. Therefore “youth” as used in conflict
contexts is a “verb” rather than a “noun”. Second, while youthfulness is individual, to
acquire  that  status  in  ways  that  matter  to  social  navigation it  has  to  be  expressed
within the context of a social group. This means that “youth” is not just a verb, it is also
a plural one. Third, to be youth both requires and implies that one is connected to
broader politicised structures of patronage through which access to the proceeds of oil
(mostly illegal) revenue is determined. This notion of youthhood can account for many
of the social categories that have played central roles in the renegotiation of the nature
of  power,  citizenship  and  democracy  across  Africa.  From  Liberia  to  Egypt,  youth
denotes an active social category willing and able to make claims against the state and
able to live (and thrive) on its margins.
14 The implications of this conceptualisation of “youth” as a verb are profound. In the
first place, it fractures the generational category of the young and ultimately privileges
those  whose  activities  can  be  most  disruptive  to  the  social  order.  This  way  of
conceptualising youth is apparent in the way the Niger Delta Amnesty3 was structured
so that the benefits were directed at “youth” rather than the young. It is also apparent
in the measures many young people took in order to acquire the status of “youth” as a
way  of  inserting  themselves  into  the  lucrative  space  of  youthhood  offered  by  the
Amnesty. As it appears here, youth cannot simply be “imagined” or “lived”, it also has
to be “done” in order to separate social actors from a less forceful and marginalised
generational  category.  Secondly,  this  conceptualisation  of  youth  almost  always
excludes females. In fact, I did not find any instance in which “youth” was inclusive of
young women in the way the concept was used. This is strange given the important role
that  many  young  women  play  in  the  politics  of  the  region  and  indeed  within  the
youthscape itself. However, their visibility is practically written out of the discourse of
youth in the Niger Delta and it is hard to find women in the popular discursive space
referred to as “youth”. Where women’s roles are included in the narrative, “women” or
“girls” are actually the preferred terms rather than youth. This is also applicable where
respondents are female. What this means is that when people refer to “the youth” in
the region, they almost exclusively mean young men. This is of course a problematic
way  of  thinking  of  the  term.  However,  I  maintain  fidelity  with  this  all-male
conceptualisation in this study primarily because my focus is actually on young men
and that conceptualisation does no analytical damage to the questions I explored. This
is not to be taken to mean that young women played no part in the networks that I
studied.  The  networks  are,  however,  overwhelmingly  male  and,  perhaps  more
importantly, the space is very masculine. In fact, in the cases in which young women
come up, they seemed to take on masculine identities. Performing masculinity is a key
aspect of “doing” youth.
15 In the subsequent mapping of youth politics, it should be noted that youth is defined
along the lines of its usefulness as a verb of action and in its predominantly masculine
form.  Youth  thus  is  taken  to  mean  people,  mostly  men,  who,  by  virtue  of  their
participation in various social actions which renegotiate or aim to renegotiate social
relations,  are  willing  to  claim  and  capable  of  claiming  to  belong  to  a  younger
generation for the purpose of appropriating the spaces of contentious politics.  This
conception of youth builds on rather than abandons the different notions of youth—as
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a life-stage (Johnson-Hanks,  2002),  as  a  subculture of  sociality  (Latysheva,  2011),  as
becoming (Christiansen et al., 2006; Vigh, 2009), or as something in between vanguards
and vandals (Abbink and Kessel, 2005)—that have shaped analysis of political instability
in many African states over the last decade.
16 What this way of thinking about youth does is that it consciously disaggregates the
politically  active  youth  from  the  general  pool  of  the  young  (both  biologically  and
socially  so).  This  disaggregation  is  informed  by  the  highly  politically  charged
connotation that the use of the term “youth” often implies in contexts where violence
is driven wholly or in part by insurgencies either themed around specific generational
tensions or in which generational boundaries play a critical role in mobilisation. In this
respect,  the idea of  who can claim to be youth or who is  characterised as youth is
dependent on acts of doing rather than of being.
 
Youth and angels in Colombia
17 Very few places have been more emblematic of contentious sites of youthful power and
agency at the turn of the millennium than the oil rich Niger Delta region of Nigeria.
The Colombia neighbourhood provides interesting illustrations of how youth is framed
which highlight  its  articulation  as  an  active  verb  of  self-expression  as  well  as  of
belonging. A useful entry point is to explore the distinction between the youth and the
so called “angels” of Colombia as a way of illustrating the earlier point about being
youth and being young.
18 There were two main categories of young men circulating in Colombia. The first and
most visible was a significant minority who belonged to the many gangs, fraternities
and cults4 which were the driving forces behind the illicit but highly lucrative drug and
prostitution rings that milled around Colombia’s Number One Field. The Number One
Field was bound on one side by the Romeo Night Club, which was little more than a
crudely cobbled together cluster of wooden sheds and temporary brick buildings. This
club provided space for transactional sex and sheltered spaces in which many of the
bigger drug deals were conducted. The members of the various youth gangs often sat
around long tables in different parts of the Number One Field socialising. They lived in
a  world  that  was  evidently  separate  from  that  of  many  of  their  contemporaries,
especially in language of expression, dress code and body art. One group called The
Uglies went out of its way to show its separateness from both angels and other gang
members.
19 The  Uglies  were  initially  known  as  a  dance  group  and  their  key  identity  was  the
deliberate  culturing  of  grotesque  body  art,  hairstyles  and  modes  of  dressing.  This
counterculture  was  created  in  defiance  of  bourgeois  notions  of  respectability  that
appeared to be popular with angels. This bourgeois respectability emphasised western
education, Christianity, and “gentlemanly” behaviour. In the chaotic and violent space
of  Colombia,  however,  these  notions of  respectability  held  little  meaning  for  gang
members  who  have  to  daily  navigate  very  uncertain  and  dangerous  social
environments. The Uglies emerged in Okirika, a town just outside of Port Harcourt, but
became quite popular in Colombia and around the waterfront slums of the oil city. One
Colombia resident described the distinction between The Uglies and angels:
You see even though Colombia was dangerous, fights everywhere, people dying and
all  that.  It  was  a  very  lively  place.  And when there  wasn’t  any fight,  what  the
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difference between the boys and angels? You see? That is where people like the
Uglies come in. If you see someone that belongs, you can’t call that person an angel.
They are different. Is it the tattoo? Or the dressing? Or even the way they talk? You
can’t even wear some colours if you are an angel. If you wear a yellow-yellow [a
combination of yellow shirt and pants], and you don’t belong, you are just asking
for trouble. So you see, the angels were not really there. They were there, but not
really there, you know what I mean?
The  point  this  resident  was  making  is  that  during  the  long  periods  in  which  gun
violence did not easily distinguish between those who were considered youth and the
young, other forms of identity signifiers and markers were deliberately cultivated and
constructed as a way of performing (or, if you like, “doing”) youth. Those who could
claim the space and identity of youth were thus those like members of the Uglies who
could embed themselves within a counterculture that defined itself in opposition to
society.
20 It is interesting to note that this distinction is not only made by angels but also by the
Nigerian State itself. I was consistently struck by the tendency of young people who did
not claim affiliation with any gang to refer to gang members as “the youth”. When
prodded  about  why  they  seem  to  “other”  the  youth  category  even  though  they
themselves were apparently young, one of them explained it quite aptly thus: 
Yes I know I am also supposed to be a youth. But am I? Can I join them in their
runs? So if I can’t follow them out to operations how can someone be one of them?
When we say youth here, nor be people like me o [Nobody refers to people like me
when they call people “youth”].
21 Indeed, the Nigerian state’s conception of who can claim to be the youth of the oil Delta
also  conforms  to  this  street-constructed  notion  of  youthhood.  For  instance,  the
Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration programme launched as an Amnesty
project in 2009 focused almost exclusively on the category of violent youth. While this
is not surprising, it is interesting to note that this happened in spite of the declared
goal of government to use the Amnesty as a tool to “develop” the whole of the Niger
Delta rather than the narrow minority of youth who belong.
 
Doing youth and the Delta cults of respectability
If you don’t join them you are a lazy man. In fact
you are not a man. They won’t respect you.
(Peter, int., 9 April 2013)
22 The  way  in  which  youthhood  is  framed  is  also  intimately  connected  to  the  way
respectability  is  conceptualised  in  these  contexts.  Indeed,  to  be  youth  means  to
perform (or to do) respectability in specific ways that fit into the Niger Delta’s universe
of  macho violence and competition.  The neighbourhood of  Colombia  embodies  this
dynamic in interesting ways. A good example is the process of rule formation within
one of the most prominent groups in Colombia in the mid-1990s, the OX. According to
multiple interview respondents, an Agaba Boys group called the “OX” had been formed
by the Colombia youth partly as a response to the arrest of Gowon, a local youth leader
who  controlled  much  of  the  activity  in  Colombia  in  the  1990s.  Members  of  the
community allege that the main reason for the constant police harassment was actually
to extort bribes rather than to clamp down on illegal activities.  As Darlington (int.,
2015), a former member of the OX put it, “We were like ATMs5 for the police. They need
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money for beer, they arrest, they need money for pepper soup, na [its] Colombia they
will come [to].” The survival of the gangs and their consequent metamorphosis into
vigilantes and/or militant groups by the early 2000s seems to justify this cynicism.
23 The running battles between the OX and the police generated unprecedented solidarity
among the young people of 1990s Colombia, but also created tensions that often boiled
over  into  violence  when  the  different  decks6 clashed  over  how  to  respond  to  the
multiple challenges the group faced. While the problem with the police was the initial
drive,  the emergence of  rival  groups around Port  Harcourt  and a  growing national
university cult crisis meant that increasing attention was devoted to clashes with other
youth gangs. It was on this new violent frontier that masculinities were being created
and constantly tested. As Darlington (int., 2015) explained:
[…] but many boys were forming their own groups. The boys in Diobu, all those
university boys, everywhere, Benin, Warri, Lagos. Everything just turned messy all
of a sudden. It was even worse after Operation Crush killed Gowon. It was that time
trouble started between town and Diobu, as there was no one to talk to people. In
no time, the problem was no longer the police but Deewell.
24 As the intergang clashes unfolded by the late 1990s and early 2000s, pitting different
armed groups of young men against one another, the main basis of solidarity among
Colombia youth, which was a common enemy in the police, began to fracture and not
even the creation of street-wide vigilante-like systems could guarantee solidarity in the
way it  existed before the death of Gowon. It  was in the context of these fracturing
solidarities that greater demands were placed on young men to earn respect by proving
their  masculinity.  As  the  opening  quote  in  this  section  indicates,  masculinity  was
defined in violent terms, it required a capacity to inflict violence as well as endure it. It
also depended in good part on the ability to perform violence,  to act it  even when
actual violence is not or cannot be used.
25 According to accounts, in the midst of the turmoil, the OX met sometime in 1999 and
drew up a code requiring members to “act with reason, with courage, and like men”.
They were also required to “never forgive” and to “leave the last man”. Darlington,
who was at that meeting, described the motivations:
That night we held a meeting in Occasion’s house. Occasion just got to the area, but
he  was  connected  and  was  trying  to  bring  people  together.  Many  of  the  boys
causing trouble since Gowon was killed didn’t like Occasion mainly because he was
new. But this Occasion boy was a senior man. He was courageous. Because some of
the boys  were  formerly  from Colombia,  and moved to  Diobu because  of  all  the
trouble, it was hard for people to agree to murder them. So we set rules. You know?
Something like a code of conduct. You must not act like a woman, you must never
forgive, you know? No retreat no surrender. Anybody that can’t prove himself and
act like a man cannot be a national. You can’t be a leader in OX. So everybody began
to behave.
26 It was clear from my conversations with Darlington and other men who had been active
in Colombia in those years that one of the reasons the masculine codes were drawn up
was to  resolve lingering doubts  among lower-level  members  of  the gang about  the
proprietary of inflicting sometimes fatal violence on people who were former members
of the Colombia community but who had fled as a result of disputes over the transfer of
power  to  Occasion  after  Gowon’s  death.  The  codes  were  essentially  designed  to
blackmail  these  members  into  action  by  targeting  one  of  the  core  sociological
motivations that recruited them to participation in the first place—the respect of their
peers. By constructing a social code that linked violent masculinity to respectability,
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the OX leadership effectively created a tool of control that was subtle in its visibility yet
powerful in its overall effect. They also effectively reconstructed what it meant to be
youth by rupturing the social norms under which young people had been brought up as
well  as  by  othering  less-connected  members  of  the  same  youth  universe.  Bright,
another former member of the OX, explained the aftermath of this meeting:
Immediately it became that if you don’t fight nobody will recognise you, many new
boys even joined. They wanted to be seen, to prove themselves. Some of them even
went  overboard.  That  was  a  time  of  real  men,  not  these  boys  shooting
indiscriminately now. People became rugged men, they became youth.
27 The way violence was inscribed into notions of masculinity by the OX validates Lake’s
(1986)  argument  that  men are  socialised  into  masculinity  rather  than born into  it.
Tapping into broader ideas about the “fighting man” as well as a popular history of
many communities in the Delta, where, according to one of my informants, Tonye (int.,
2015),  “every family has a war canoe”, the OX appealed to a sense of worth that is
mediated by violence in all its ramifications. It also appealed to a new way of thinking
about youth, a way that connected youthhood to the performance of violence and to
circulation in the precarious universe of opportunities and risks that it generates.
*
* *
28 The  reality  for  many  active  Delta  youth  is  that  they  live,  as  Chernoff  (2003:  41)
describes for the so-called “marginal people”, in a “realm where norms and their limits
are often highlighted” and, as such, they are particularly “well informed about points
of breakdown, weakness and ineffectiveness in the institutions of competing systems”.
This awareness implies that they are well suited to exploiting the very notion of their
marginality in ways that allow them to exert subtle influences on political power. It
also means that they are able to set themselves apart from other less-connected young
people in ways that allow them to corner the resources of state that are allocated to
their common generation. In many ways, the distinction between youth and the young,
along with the questions surrounding respect and marginality, all combine to show the
internal  contradictions  and  contestations  that  ultimately  occur  within  the  youth
category itself.  This encourages the unpacking of youth in meaningful ways.  It  also
highlights  the different  ways  in  which youthhood can be framed by the politics  of
extraction. By providing the opportunities for illicit accumulation on the one hand and
simultaneously distorting local  economies on the other,  oil  extraction (or any such
disruptive  multinational  capital  and  technology-intensive  activity)  generates  social
contestations that often spill over into the everyday politics of youth. These patterns
are observable not just in the Niger Delta but also in other extractive contexts.  For
instance, Levin (2006) writes about the impacts of alluvial diamond mining in Sierra
Leone’s  Kono region on the political  economy of  social  organisation while  Sayndee
(2008)  and  Richards  (1996)  make  similar  points  about  youth  cultures  and  resource
extraction in Liberia.
29 Bourdieu was right to have argued that neither youth nor age is self-evident as they are
both “socially manipulated and manipulable” (1993: 95). Yet the assumption that those
who manipulate the meaning of youth are necessarily embedded in adult power centres
misses the point of youth as a social construct. In periods of rapid and uncertain social
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transitions, in which the youth category is both the threat as well as an opportunity,
the  notion  of  youth  is  connected  simultaneously  to  acts  of  doing  things—of
intervention and of participation—and to the implications of not doing those things.
This distinction between those who do and those who do not (or between youth and 
angels as  in the Niger Delta)  is  central  to understanding how violence spatially and
socially shapes the construction of youthhood. Its framing is also largely determined by
those who operate within the youthscapes rather than by those outside it.  In other
words, the legitimacy of that label flows outwards from the youthscape into society
rather than the other way round. In places of calm and peace, the notion of youth could
be accurately captured by the very fact of being. Being in this context refers both to
biology and to sociality and is constituted by a striving for social adulthood. The exact
articulation of this striving, as well as its outcome, is framed by prevailing modernities
and hegemonies. As the Comaroffs (2006: 20) put it, modernity “casts ‘youth’ as both
the essential precondition and the indefinite postponement of maturity”. But what is
clear is that what constitutes a youth in this type of context is not so much what youth
do or do not do, but more about where they are on the social ladder—what they are (or
have). This  generalised  notion  of  youth,  however,  struggles  to  apply  where  social
relations and the norms governing them are ruptured by long periods of violence. This
is  even more true where violence has become the  context rather than happening in
context, in which case, doing youth becomes more important than being youth.
30 One should also listen to what youth means when the label is used by people living
within contexts of generationally-themed violence. When they say “youth”, do they
refer to a  state of  having not attained social  adulthood (as  in Cruise O’Brien,  1996;
Honwana, 2012) or do they refer to the very act of intervention, of resisting and of
challenging established authority? It appears that what the so-called “marginal” people
do or do not do is more crucial to their self-framing and how they are framed than
what they are. This is why the question of “how can you call yourself youth when you
sit down there doing nothing?” (Bozi, int., 2014) is an important illustration of what is
meant when  people  on  the  ground  describe  someone  as  youth.  To  ensure  greater
analytical clarity when analysing contexts of permanent violence, this study suggests
that scholars should discuss being youth as distinct from being young (whether socially
or  biologically).  In  this  sense,  youth  takes  on  verb  form  and  describes  actions,
aspirations, and agency rather than marginality or becoming.
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Interviewees (all male)
Amadi, age about 33, grew up in Bende Street, Port Harcourt and frequented the drug hotspots of
Colombia in the 1990s and early 2000s. Interviewed intermittently between August 2014–March
2015.
Bozi, member of the Icelander cult, interviewed in Yenagoa, October 2014.
Darlington, ex-militant, former resident of Colombia, now resident in Lagos. Received amnesty
and spent time in Igbinedion University, Okada. Interviewed at Okada in September 2014. Follow-
up phone interviews between 2015 and 2016.
Peter C., then 26-year-old ex-militant fighter of the Niger Delta Volunteers (NDV), based in
Warri, Delta State, from Tsekelewu, enrolled in the amnesty programme and was sponsored to
study for a degree at the Lead City University, Ibadan. Interviewed intermittently between March
2013 and April 2013 and intermittently in 2014 and 2015.
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Tarela A., then 29-year-old former member of the Vikings cult group, enrolled in the amnesty
programme and sponsored to study for a degree at the Lead City University, Ibadan. Interviewed
intermittently between March and April 2013.
Tarela E., academic from Bayelsa State, informal consultations.
Tonye, current long-term resident of Bende Street in Colombia, member of the Buccaneers cult
group, about 28 years of age. Interviewed intermittently between August 2014 and March 2015.
NOTES
1. Bunkering is the term used locally to refer to the theft of crude oil. This is often accomplished
by drilling into pipelines carrying crude from extraction sites to refineries or for subsequent
export and siphoning large quantities for sale. A good percentage of this stolen crude is sold on
the local market where it is transported in small barges to remote sites hidden from view by the
thick mangrove forests and from where it is refined using crude artisanal methods and then sold
in the open market. A good description of the entire value chain and of the narratives used to
legitimise this by youth is available in UGOR (2013).
2. Those who “belong” are those who are members of any of the many cult groups, youth gangs,
vigilantes or militias that dot the Niger Delta region. This is cult slang that is quite popular across
Southern Nigeria. Those who do not belong are referred to variously as civilians, “Jew men”,
angels, or simply young men.
3. After  years  of  violence  directed  against  the  Nigerian  state  and  oil  multinationals,  the
government launched a Presidential Amnesty Programme in 2009 to attempt to end the violence
and establish the peace needed to guarantee the continued extraction of oil from the Niger Delta.
By the conclusion of the major disarmament phase, about 30,000 youth had surrendered weapons
and gone through what was dubbed a peace and empowerment training. For more information
on the amnesty,  its  political  motivation,  and its  aftermath,  see NWAJIAKU-DAHOU (2012),  U SHIE
(2013) and IWILADE (2017).
4. There are numerous gangs operating in Port Harcourt. Some have estimated the number at
somewhere around 100 (CONCANNON and NEWSOM, 2004), and the Rivers State Government actually
announced a ban on 103 cult groups in 2004 (RIVERS STATE GOVERNMENT, 2004). Massive as this
number  apparently  is,  it  conceals  a  more  complex  universe  of  gangs,  constantly  shifting
alliances, membership and reach. Indeed, the gang landscape in city is so complicated that one
former member of the Vikings, Tarela A (int., 2014) told me that one of the biggest problems
faced by members sometimes is “you never know who is fighting who or where the fighting is
going to happen”. In his words, “we just tag along anywhere the belly faces”. One way to decode
the different organisations is to look at the labels with which they describe themselves. Cults or
fraternities are usually based in university campuses, especially the University of Port Harcourt
and the Rivers State University of Science and Technology (RSUST) in Bori. Militants are usually
based in the creeks or around the city itself and often actively frame themselves in the language
of resistance and ethnic community. In reality, however, their activities are very similar to those
other groups. Then there are those groups which tend to veil their activities in the language of
vigilantes,  occult  groups or artistic  performances like the Agaba,  the Egbesu Boys,  Njemanze
Vigilante and the Uglies. These are based in the various waterfront slums across the city as well
as  in notorious neighbourhoods like Colombia. These divisions,  however,  tell  little  about the
shifting alliances or indeed what the dispute or collaboration is about at any given time.
5. Cash machine.
6. Organisational units of cult groups are often referred to as Decks.
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ABSTRACTS
This paper uses an ethnography of youth gangs in the oil-rich Niger Delta region of Nigeria to
explore  the  distinctions  between being  young and  being  youth and  to  argue  that,  in  order  to
understand the complexities of a category whose politics have profoundly influenced the history
of contemporary social transitions in many African societies, one must analytically disaggregate
its various components and highlight the interesting ways in which various contexts can shape
it. There is of course a wide variety of spatial and historical contexts which shape the nature of
the experiences that youth have. In this paper, the context of oil extraction and a long history of
violent  social  ruptures  in  the  Niger  Delta  are  used  as  entry  points  into  understanding  how
youthhood is framed as well as understood, and how different categories of actors engage with
its constantly changing realities.
À partir d’une ethnographie conduite au sein des gangs de jeunes dans la région pétrolifère du
delta du Niger au Nigeria, l’article analyse la distinction que ces voyous opèrent et manipulent
entre le fait d’« être jeune » et celui de « jouer au jeune ». Cette distinction illustre la complexité
de catégories qui ont profondément influencé le changement dans les sociétés contemporaines
en Afrique. Il y a bien sûr une grande variété de contextes spatiaux et historiques qui façonnent
la nature des expériences vécues par les jeunes. Ici, le contexte de l'extraction pétrolière et une
longue histoire de ruptures sociales violentes dans le delta du Niger sont utilisés comme points
d'entrée pour comprendre comment la jeunesse peut être délimitée et appréhendée, et comment
diverses catégories d'acteurs se jouent de ses contours mouvants et de ses attributs changeants.
INDEX
Geographical index: Delta du Niger, Nigéria
Mots-clés: catégorie de jeunes, extraction pétrolière, groupes de jeunes, localité, vie
quotidienne, violence
Keywords: everyday life, locality Niger Delta, Nigeria, oil extraction, violence, youth category,
youth groups
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